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In addition to gerund-noun-noun titles and a concern with the 
misaligned incentives of businesses that handle consumers’ financial data, 
Chris Hoofnagle’s Internalizing Identity Theft1 and Juliet Moringiello’s 
Warranting Data Security2 share something else: hidden themes. 
Hoofnagle’s paper is officially about an empirical study of identity theft, 
but behind the scenes it’s also an exploration of where we draw the line 
between public information shared freely and secret information used to 
authenticate individuals. Moringiello’s paper is officially a proposal for a 
new warranty of secure handling of payment information, but under the 
surface, it invites us to think about the relationship between property and 
contract in the payment system. Parts I and II, respectively, of this brief 
essay will explore these hidden themes in Hoofnagle’s and Moringiello’s 
articles. I hope the exercise will tell us something interesting about these 
two papers, and also about the problems of privacy and security in the 
payment system. A brief conclusion will add a personal note to the mix. 
I. INTERNALIZING IDENTITY THEFT: KNOWN AND 
UNKNOWN 
Chris Hoofnagle’s Internalizing Identity Theft is built around a clever, 
if obscure, provision in the federal Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions 
Act of 2003 (FACTA).3 A victim of identity theft is entitled to obtain any 
“application and business transaction records” relating to the theft from the 
entity that did business with the identity thief.4 This remedy helps victims 
recover from identity theft,5 but Hoofnagle realized it could also be used to 
study the problem. He convinced identity-theft victims to request their files 
and share them with him, allowing him to sketch a portrait of how new-
account fraud happens in the real world.6 
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Running through Internalizing Identity Theft is a recurring question: 
how much information about us should be well-known and public, and how 
much should be unknown and private? In the first place, identity theft itself 
depends on what is known and unknown about potential victims. Hoofnagle 
frames the issue in terms of a debate between Daniel Solove and Lynn 
LoPucki.7 To Solove, identity theft is a crime of too much knowledge.8 
When an individual’s identifying, personal information flows freely through 
computer systems, unscrupulous fraudsters can access that information and 
use it to impersonate her.9 In contrast, LoPucki describes identity fraud as a 
crime of too little knowledge.10 Identity thieves take advantage of the fact 
that all of the millions of differences between themselves and their victims 
are unknown to the credit-granting business.11 
Despite this apparent tension, both stories are right in important ways. 
Identity theft is only possible when the fraudster knows enough about the 
victim to plausibly impersonate her and the credit grantor doesn’t know 
enough to make the impersonation implausible again. That is, identity theft 
is a crime of differential knowledge; it requires the perpetrator to know at 
least as much about the victim as the credit grantor does. It’s a kind of 
Turing Test: if the would-be thief can answer every question about the 
victim that the credit grantor knows how to ask, there is no way for the 
grantor to tell the two of them apart.12 It follows that identity theft is not a 
monotonic function of the quantity of publicly available information about 
the victim. Putting more information in circulation helps thieves fool 
businesses and helps businesses catch thieves; which effect will dominate 
isn’t something we can easily determine without getting our hands dirty. 
Hence the importance of studies like Hoofnagle’s. The remarkably 
consistent pattern in his results is that credit grantors aren’t making 
effective use of the information they already have access to. Every single 
fraudulent application in the study got basic, easily checked information 
wrong: the wrong address, the wrong date of birth, even the wrong spelling 
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of the victim’s name.13 Identity thieves are dumb, and the companies who 
offer them credit are even dumber. 
While this may be a depressing comment on the sloppiness of 
American business practices, it’s actually an encouraging finding from a 
policy perspective. We’re not caught between Solove’s rock and LoPucki’s 
hard place; there’s information readily available to businesses that 
fraudsters don’t have.14 This means there may well be money lying on the 
table; if businesses had cleaner credit-granting procedures, they’d get more 
cases right.15 Hoofnagle suggests that credit grantors be subject to strict 
liability for the harms they cause when they grant credit to the wrong 
person.16 He’s not asking them to do the impossible. 
The tension between known and unknown also crops up in the FACTA 
file-access process Hoofnagle’s study relies on. There’s an obvious security 
benefit from procedures like it, which give consumers the right to find out 
the details when someone applies for credit in their names. Not only does it 
help them fix mistakes after the fact; it helps them detect and prevent 
impersonation attempts in the first place.17 
But there’s a catch. There’s always a catch. A credit grantor who 
receives a FACTA request cannot simply assume that the requester really is 
the person whose name appears in the file. Structurally, this is a hard 
problem for exactly the same reasons that identification during the credit-
granting process is hard. The credit grantor has no personal history with the 
requester, is dealing with him or her at arm’s (or more likely, wire’s) 
length, has few outside sources of identifying information it can consult, 
and may even have incorrect data in its own files.18 
FACTA takes a cut at this dilemma by requiring identity verification 
before the business releases its records to the requester.19 Indeed, the 
business may decline to release the records if it “does not have a high 
degree of confidence in knowing the true identity of the individual 
requesting the information.”20 There are similar processes in the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act,21 the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act,22 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Hoofnagle, supra note 1, at 8–13. 
 14. Id. at 13. 
 15. Id. at 15–17. 
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 18. LoPucki, Privacy, supra note 10, at 1284. 
 19. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(e)(2)(A) (2006). The business may also require proof of identity theft in 
the form of a police report, a threshold that can act as a deterrent to would-be impostors. Id. § 
1681g(e)(2)(B)(i). 
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and the Privacy Act,23 among other places. Any measure designed to give 
individuals control over the distribution of their personal information—that 
is, to limit knowledge about them—requires, as a practical matter, some 
kind of identity-verification system. 
Any such system, in essence, allows someone who presents the right 
kind of credentials to see certain information. As the very existence of the 
FACTA file-access remedy itself demonstrates, however, not everyone 
presenting credentials is who they claim to be. Sarah Palin’s Yahoo! email 
account was hacked, in “an attack that any 17-year-old in America could 
have mounted,” by an intruder who spent 45 minutes of Internet research 
looking up Wasilla, Alaska’s two zip codes and confirming that Palin and 
her husband had met in high school.24 Moreover, rules designed to filter out 
fraudsters almost certainly also filter out some legitimate requests from 
victims of identity theft. These victims thus find themselves trapped in the 
Kafkaesque position of being unable to prove that they really are 
themselves, to the satisfaction of a business that has already shown itself 
incapable of correctly telling who they are. 
Worse, identification measures designed to limit information flows also 
necessarily create them. Information used to authenticate in one context can 
be used to defraud in another. When multiple web sites use the same 
security questions—What is the name of your pet? What is your mother’s 
maiden name?—they become security risks for each other. Even systems 
that use sophisticated, interactive, multi-step authentication technologies are 
vulnerable to being snookered by phishers who first impersonate a business 
to its customer, and then, having talked the customer out of the critical 
identifying information, impersonate the customer to the business.25 The 
continual slow leakage of “private” information used to authenticate 
individuals has a hydraulic effect; as this information becomes increasingly 
public, the threshold of information required for reliable authentication 
rises. 
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In a final twist, the problem of the known and the unknown also 
appears in the difficulty Hoofnagle had finding subjects to participate in the 
FACTA study, even after posting ads on the heavily-read Craigslist site.26 
For understandable reasons, victims of identity theft often prefer not to talk 
publicly about the experience.27 But this means there is no simple way to 
find a list of identity theft victims and call them up. Ultimately, only six 
subjects completed the study, and five of them were recruited through ID 
Watchdog, a company that helps victims of identity theft.28 They, in other 
words, had already stepped forward to identify themselves. This is how you 
end up with an N=6 study. 
For similar reasons, Hoofnagle’s study identifies the subjects only as 
X1 through X6. It’s a common social-science precaution to protect study 
participants, and one obviously of particular concern to identity-theft 
victims. Even with confidentiality, two participants found the subject too 
“upsetting” and dropped out of the study after learning what it would 
entail.29 For a study about the problem of identification, the results are a bit 
incongruous. At one point, Hoofnagle writes, “It is difficult to visualize this 
case without illustration, but such a description would breach 
confidentiality.”30 One shudders to think what the process of obtaining IRB 
approval must have been like.31 
Amusingly, Hoofnagle also had to deal with would-be fraudsters 
himself. The study provided gift cards to participants to compensate them 
for their time and effort.32 Multiple people called in response to the initial 
Craigslist ads, “with dubious tales of fraud, in transparent attempts to get a 
gift card.”33 They were, in other words, fraudsters pretending to be people 
whom fraudsters had pretended to be—taking advantage of the fact that 
there is no public listing of actual victims. This secondary deception 
illustrates, yet again, the obscurity that suffuses the subject of identity theft; 
Internalizing Identity Theft sheds some rare, but valuable light on it. 
II. WARRANTING DATA SECURITY: PROPERTY AND 
CONTRACT 
Juliet Moringiello’s Warranting Data Security investigates the rights of 
consumers whose payment information—such as credit card numbers—is 
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 27. Id. 
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stolen in a data breach.34 Although consumers typically face little if any 
liability for unauthorized charges35 (at least the ones that they notice 
promptly36), they bear a number of other costs, both monetary and 
intangible: credit monitoring, replacement card fees, lost time and effort, 
and emotional distress, to name a few.37 Moringiello argues that as between 
the consumer and the merchant whose sloppy security led to the data 
breach, it would be fairer and more efficient to let these costs fall on the 
merchant.38 The heart of her paper is an attempt to map this normative 
argument onto the doctrines of payments law; she concludes that an implied 
warranty of a secure payment system would be a good fit.39 
This time, the recurring motif is the uncertain boundary between 
property and contract. Moringiello’s analysis jumps off from a classic 
question of contract law: whether the implied warranties in Article 2 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) provide a basis for consumers to recover 
their indirect damages.40 Unfortunately for consumer plaintiffs, contract law 
as reflected in the UCC doesn’t offer suitable warranties.41 Neither the 
warranty of merchantability nor the warranty of fitness for a particular 
purpose is a close fit for payment information security.42 Worse, the UCC 
applies only in the sale of goods43 (i.e. the sale of tangible movable 
property44), and both warranties can be disclaimed.45 
This leads Moringiello to shift from contract law to property law, 
specifically to the law of residential leases.46 Led by the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit, American courts in many states read an 
implied warranty of habitability into most residential leases over the last 
half century.47 A residential tenant is entitled to premises “fit for 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Moringiello, supra note 2, at 63–72. 
 35. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1693g (2006) (limiting the liability of a debit cardholder for 
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 38. Id. at 65, 72–80. 
 39. Id. at 80–83. 
 40. Id. at 72–80 (drawing inspiration from a recent case, In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer 
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 41. Id. at 71. 
 42. See id. at 72–80. 
 43. U.C.C. § 2-102 (2009). 
 44. Id. § 2-103(k). 
 45. See id. § 2-316. 
 46. Moringiello, supra note 2, at 80–83. 
 47. See 2 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 16B.04 n.37 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., Matthew 
Bender & Company, Inc. 2010) (listing states). 
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habitation”;48 an unsafe apartment is ipso facto a breach of the lease on the 
landlord’s part.49 Moringiello’s proposal for an analogous, unwaivable 
implied warranty of payment information security is thus a conscious effort 
to make contract law more like property.50 
Historically, however, courts and commentators described the implied 
warranty of habitability as a movement in the other direction, one in which 
property law became more like contract.51 Common-law courts had treated 
a lease as a pair of “independent covenants”: the landlord conveyed a 
leasehold estate to the tenant, and the tenant covenanted to pay rent.52 Even 
if the land was uninhabitable, the tenant’s independent obligation to pay 
rent continued.53 As the court in Paradine v. Jane explained, “[T]hough the 
land be surrounded, or gained by the sea, or made barren by wildfire, yet 
the lessor shall have his whole rent.”54 
The courts that created the implied warranty of habitability took 
inspiration from contract law, emphasizing instead the real-world purposes 
for which the lease was made.55 On a contractual view of the world, an 
uninhabitable residence looks a lot like the subject matter of a contract 
whose essential purpose has failed, and thus, it becomes plausible to treat 
the tenant’s promise to pay rent as dependent on the landlord’s promise to 
deliver possession in a form the tenant can actually use.56 Other doctrinal 
shifts in the landlord-tenant revolution, such as imposing a duty to mitigate 
damages on the landlord whose tenant moves out mid-lease, similarly drew 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
 49. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (LANDLORD AND TENANT) § 5.1 (1977) 
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 52. See, e.g., Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006, 1011 (Utah 1991) (“Under traditional property 
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 53. See, e.g., Lawler v. Capital City Life Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 438, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1933). 
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under the gracious protection of caveat emptor. 
Id. 
 54. Paradine v. Jane, (1647) 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B.) 898. 
 55. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1079. 
 56. See Edward Chase & E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., Landlord and Tenant: A Study in Property and 
Contract, 30 VILL. L. REV. 571, 616–41 (1985) (discussing destruction-of-premises cases as 
propertarian or contractual). 
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on the idea that the lease was primarily a contract and only secondarily a 
transfer of a property interest.57 
Still, as much as a lease is a contract, it is still also a property 
transaction, and as the habitability revolution took hold, it stopped drinking 
as deeply from the contractarian well. Concerned about oppressive 
landlords and unfortunate tenants, courts allowed tenants alleging a breach 
of the warranty to remain in possession while withholding rent, even when 
the most natural contractual remedy would have been recission.58 Even 
more dramatically, they made the implied warranty of habitability non-
waivable—a logical enough consumer-protection move, but not exactly one 
consistent with classical freedom of contract.59 The modern implied 
warranty of habitability—a strong set of mandatory minima for residential 
houses and apartments—has less to do with the logic of contract, in which 
the parties are free to pick whatever rule they wish, and more to do with the 
logic of property, in which legal interests come only in a few standardized 
packages, and the parties must order one or another from the menu given 
them.60 
On that note, return to Moringiello’s proposed warranty—to be 
provided in any transaction that uses the payments system—that the 
retailer’s payment system is secure, regardless of whether the transaction is 
for goods, services, intangibles, or what-have-you.61 One way of thinking 
about this new warranty is that it would be incident to any transaction 
involving a payment (i.e. sales and leases), which would seem to locate it 
squarely in the contractual tradition. But perhaps “warranty” isn’t the 
closest legal category. Focus on what the retailer actually promises: to 
protect the information given to it during the payment.62 This promise 
focuses on the payment information, rather than on the nominal subject of 
the transaction. On this view, the retailer sounds more like a bailee, 
promising to keep consumers’ property (i.e. their payment information) 
secure while in its possession. While bailments are technically a species of 
property relationship, like leases they sit on the border that property shares 
with contract.63 
                                                                                                                 
 57. See, e.g., Sommer v. Kridel, 378 A.2d 767, 768–69 (N.J. 1977). 
 58. See, e.g., Pugh v. Holmes, 405 A.2d 897, 907–08 (Pa. 1979). Indeed, from the tenant’s 
point of view, the ability to remain in possession was the warranty’s principal advantage over the 
common-law doctrine of constructive eviction—an early termination of the lease by a tenant who 
claimed the premises had become unusable and proved it by moving out. See, e.g., Boston Hous. 
Auth. v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 837–38 (Mass. 1973). 
 59. See, e.g., Boston Hous. Auth., 293 N.E.2d at 843. 
 60. See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law 
of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (2000) (discussing “limited 
number of standard forms” in property law). 
 61. Moringiello, supra note 2, at 80–83. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. 
REV. 773, 811–20 (2001). 
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Bailments doctrine turns out to be a surprisingly good fit for 
Moringiello’s proposed warranty, even though bailments are most 
commonly created for tangible items: cars left in parking lots;64 goods 
stored in warehouses.65 Bailments can arise by implication, just like the 
warranty.66 A bailee is strictly liable for misdelivery, which captures the 
core legal promise of the proposed warranty.67 And a bailee’s risk of 
liability ends when it returns the goods; presumably, a retailer who deletes 
its only remaining copy of a customer’s payment information ought to be 
on safe ground from then on.68 Given this close fit, Moringiello’s bailment-
like warranty may be a more workable borrowing from property law than 
more ambitious (but so far unsuccessful) attempts to create full-fledged 
property rights in personal information.69 
Moringiello’s proposed warranty points in yet another intriguing 
direction that mixes property and contract: the problem of privity. Privity is 
already one of the classic issues in payment systems law. A promise to pay 
is a contractual obligation; the genius of negotiability doctrines is that they 
synthesize freely transferrable in rem property rights from these in 
personam contractual obligations.70 Warranties enter the picture to allocate 
liability. When something goes wrong due to fraud or carelessness, the 
various actors in the payment chain invoke their warranties to push the loss 
along the chain until it lands at the “right” place—the one whose mistake 
caused the loss.71 Privity is thus both a problem to be overcome and a 
device to track legally significant relationships. 
The same issues arise in a world with a warranty of safe payment 
information handling. If the warranty is a purely contractual affair—a 
promise made by a retailer to its customers—then it doesn’t apply when the 
breach happens further upstream, say at the retailer’s payment processor.72 
To work, the warranty seems to need to be a genuinely propertarian duty, 
one that runs with the personal data to which it is attached, no matter whose 
                                                                                                                 
 64. See, e.g., Allen v. Hyatt Regency-Nashville Hotel, 668 S.W.2d 286, 287 (Tenn. 1984) 
(treating a car left in hotel garage as a bailment). 
 65. See U.C.C. art. 7 (2004) (establishing rights and duties of bailees under warehouse receipts 
and bills of lading). 
 66. See, e.g., Russell v. American Real Estate Corp., 89 S.W.3d 204, 210–11 (Tex. App. 
2002). 
 67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 234. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 160–61 (1999) 
(proposing “a kind of property right in privacy”). 
 70. See U.C.C. § 3-203(b) (2010) (“Transfer of an instrument . . . vests in the transferee any 
right of the transferor to enforce the instrument.”); see also id. §§ 3-202, 3-305, 3-306 (allowing 
the “holder in due course” of a negotiable instrument to enforce it free from various personal 
defenses that would otherwise apply). 
 71. See id. §§ 3-416, 3-417 (specifying warranties given by transferors and presenters of 
negotiable instruments). 
 72. Moringiello, supra note 2, at 78–79. 
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hands that data is in.73 Or, perhaps, the retailer who let the data out of its 
control (by entrusting it to the untrustworthy payment processor) should be 
held liable for its subsequent misadventures. 
Either way, however, the property/contract logic of payments law 
shows the way forward. The commercial entities that process payments 
information are linked to each other by chains of contracts: merchant to 
payment processor to acquiring bank to association to issuing bank. Those 
contracts can come with warranties, express or implied or statutory, and 
losses can be pushed along the chain until they stop at the “right” place—
usually (but perhaps not always) the entity whose lax security caused the 
breach. By framing the issue as a problem of handling information 
(property) safely during a transaction (contract), Moringiello’s proposal 
enables us to focus on the essential risk-allocation question at the heart of 
payment data security. 
III. I AM X6  
And now for the twist ending: I am X6. One evening in the spring of 
2007, someone walked into a Kohl’s in Trumbull, Connecticut and claimed 
to be me. (I have an alibi; I was at a conference in Germany on the day I 
was allegedly shopping in Connecticut.) The identity thief applied for a 
Kohl’s credit card, was approved, and promptly charged a $400 mixer and 
$150 cutlery set to the card. Thoughtfully, if somewhat bafflingly, he or she 
also signed me up for the Account Ease plan, which would forgive up to 
$10,000 of debt were I to die or be seriously hospitalized. 
I first heard about it when “my” new credit card showed up in the mail; 
I promptly called up Kohl’s to inquire, and the friendly Upper 
Midwesterners who answered the phone walked me through the process of 
submitting an affidavit that my identity had been stolen. Within two days, 
they agreed that I was the victim of identity theft and released me from all 
charges. And there the matter sat, or would have, had I not offhandedly 
mentioned the incident to Chris Hoofnagle, a year and a half later, and been 
recruited into his FACTA study. 
What came back in response to my FACTA request of Kohl’s was 
unimpressive.74 There was an application, on which my last name was 
spelled “Grimmalan” in the space reserved for the first name. The signature 
looked nothing like mine—and not very much like the signature on the 
charge slip, either. The charge slip did have my social security number 
(listed as my “Cust ID”) and my name—this time, misspelled only to the 
extent of “Grimmelman.” The clerk who took the application had clearly 
                                                                                                                 
 73. See generally Molly Schaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885 
(2008) (discussing servitudes in intangible property). 
 74. See Brad Stone, How Lenders Overlook the Warning Signs of ID Theft, N.Y. TIMES BITS 
BLOG (Apr. 7, 2010, 2:21 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/07/how-lenders-overlook-
the-warning-signs-of-id-theft. 
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been sloppy, too: the store number and date were missing from the form. 
There was nothing else in the file. Even though the application specifically 
stated, “You MUST have a state issued picture ID and a current charge card 
to apply,” Kohl’s apparently hadn’t kept copies of either on file—leading 
one to ask whether the fraudster provided them in the first place. Kohl’s did 
know my mailing address—that’s how they sent me the credit card and 
bill—but it didn’t appear in the application. 
All in all, the application was transparently slipshod. Looking over the 
file, it was obvious why the nice Upper Midwesterners on the phone at 
Kohl’s had been so nice. One even remotely skeptical look at the 
application would have been enough to show that it was fraudulent. 
No one looked, though, and as a result, Kohl’s lost a mixer and some 
kitchenwares. That sort of thing happens all the time; mistaken seller-
financed credit is just another source of shrinkage, along with clumsy 
stockroom clerks and five-finger discounts. The difference is that with 
identity theft there’s another victim, even when the fraud is detected and 
admitted by the store. Kohl’s is out a mixer, but I lost time, and could have 
lost some of my creditworthiness. I didn’t lose much of either, but other 
victims aren’t so lucky. 
Most importantly, there was nothing I could have done to prevent the 
identity theft. To this day, I still don’t know where the fraudster got the 
information about me that he or she gave to Kohl’s. Nor was I present at 
Kohl’s when the deal went down; by the time I could wave my arms and 
say, “Wait! That’s not me!” the mixer was long gone. That’s why 
Hoofnagle and Moringiello appropriately focus on assigning responsibility 
within the payment system. Until we fix the systematic flaws that made 
stealing my identity feasible and profitable, it could happen to you too. 
